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Mindreading refers to the ability to attribute mental states, including thoughts, intentions
and emotions, to oneself and others, and is essential for navigating the social world.
Empirical mindreading research has predominantly featured children, groups with autism
spectrum disorder and clinical samples, and many standard tasks suffer ceiling effects
with neurologically typical (NT) adults. We first outline a case for studying mindreading
in NT adults and proceed to review tests of emotion perception, cognitive and affective
mentalizing, and multidimensional tasks combining these facets. We focus on selected
examples of core experimental paradigms including emotion recognition tests, social
vignettes, narrative fiction (prose and film) and participative interaction (in real and
virtual worlds), highlighting challenges for studies with NT adult cohorts. We conclude
that naturalistic, multidimensional approaches may be productively applied alongside
traditional tasks to facilitate a more nuanced picture of mindreading in adulthood, and
to ensure construct validity whilst remaining sensitive to variation at the upper echelons
of the ability.
Keywords: mindreading, theory of mind, mind perception, social cognition, mentalizing, emotion recognition,
review
INTRODUCTION
Mindreading describes the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, and is essential
for predicting behavior (Nichols and Stich, 2003). It comprises cognitive and affective components
dissociable at the neural level (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007; though see Pessoa, 2008),
and can be both explicit (deliberate) and implicit (automatic; Heyes and Frith, 2014), expressed
via two-systems (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009) and multi-systems cognitive models (Christensen
and Michael, 2016). Mindreading is also referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM; Wimmer and Perner,
1983) and mind perception (Gray et al., 2010). As ToM alludes to an elaborate accumulation of
concepts and mind perception minimizes agency, the term mindreading is employed here.
Since Premack and Woodruff (1978) posed the question, “does the chimpanzee have a
ToM?”, empirical mindreading research has focused on child development, autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) and, more recently, clinical groups, whereas studies featuring neurologically
typical (NT) adults are less frequent. There are compelling arguments for investigating adults’
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mindreading: mindreading ability changes across the lifespan
(Happé et al., 1998; Maylor et al., 2002; Duval et al.,
2010) and is positively associated with effective interpersonal
relationships (Castano, 2012) and prosocial behavior (Paal and
Bereczkei, 2007; Johnson, 2012). Studying adults facilitates
the construction of theoretical models, which supports an
understanding of mindreading development (Apperly et al.,
2009) and identification of diagnostic markers for ASD, clinical
and neurodegenerative disorders (e.g., Poletti et al., 2012;
Guastella et al., 2013).
Explicit and implicit mindreading abilities appear dissociable
in children, ASD and clinical samples (Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005; Senju et al., 2009), but closely related in NT adults (Kanske
et al., 2015), hence this paper will focus on explicit measures.
Whereas implicit mindreading is measured indirectly (e.g., via
eye-gaze), explicit tasks probe deliberate mental state reasoning.
A challenge for researchers lies in establishing behavioral tools
sensitive to variation at the upper echelons of mindreading, since
NT adults tend to perform at ceiling (at or near 100% accuracy)
on standard explicit measures.
Mindreading is a multidimensional construct, which has
led to inconsistent definitions across the literature (Schaafsma
et al., 2015). We aim to cover the empirical ground by
addressing: (1) emotion recognition tests [emotion perception
reflects a low-level process in affective mindreading (Mitchell
and Phillips, 2015)]; (2) cognitive and affective mentalizing
tasks measuring attribution of beliefs, intentions, desires,
and emotions, respectively; (3) multidimensional measures
combining these facets. Rather than present an exhaustive review
of the literature, we focus on selected experimental paradigms
illustrative of four core approaches: emotion recognition,
social vignettes, narrative fiction, and participative interaction,
highlighting challenges for use with NT adult samples.
EMOTION RECOGNITION
The ability to recognize emotions precedes affective mindreading
(Mitchell and Phillips, 2015). Emotion recognition tests
traditionally require participants to identify basic emotions
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, contempt, and disgust;
Ekman and Friesen, 1971, though see Awasthi and Mandal, 2015)
presented in photographs or brief video-clips of posed facial
expressions. The emotion perception literature has primarily
focused on macroexpressions: full-face unconcealed expressions
lasting more than 0.5 s, however, strong agreement of the basic
emotions can result in ceiling effects with NT adults. One
approach is to speed up presentation so that stimuli represent
microexpressions (Ekman and Friesen, 1976), which last up
to 0.25 s and are usually fragmentary (appearing on the top
or bottom half of the face). Brief presentations can remain
on the retina for longer [e.g., Brief Emotion Recognition Test
(BART; Ekman and Friesen, 1974)], though this is resolvable by
incorporating neutral expressions as forward–backward masks
(Matsumoto et al., 2000). Microexpressions are involuntary,
tending to signal concealed or altered emotion expressions,
so perceiving them likely reflects the advanced capacity to
detect deception in real-life interactions (Frank and Svetieva,
2015).
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Eyes Test; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001a), requires participants to attribute the
most appropriate mental state term (e.g., “ashamed,” “nervous,”
“suspicious,” and “indecisive”) to photographs of the eye-regions
of faces. The task probes non-automatic processes (Bull et al.,
2008), was designed to detect subtle deficits (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997), and has been applied to a range of domains, including
brain studies (Adolphs et al., 2002), dementia (Gregory et al.,
2002), and clinical disorders (e.g., Fett et al., 2011). The Eyes
Test demonstrates particularly strong predictive power with ASD
groups, supporting its validity as a measure of the social cognitive
deficits characteristic of ASD: In the original study, performance
negatively correlated with Autism Spectrum Quotient scores
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b), which may be due to the “purity” of
the stimuli minimizing the opportunity to depend on alternative
(e.g., verbal) cues (cf. Happé, 1995). The Eyes Test is one of
few “classic” mindreading tasks sensitive to variation in NT
adults, however, it measures emotion recognition rather than
mindreading per se. This is an important distinction as emotion
recognition and other mindreading dimensions can dissociate
(Oakley et al., 2016).
Emotion recognition stimuli processed via a single modality
[including facial/body images or auditory voice recordings (e.g.,
Rutherford et al., 2002)] present a specific problem for research
with NT adults, and a general issue of ecological validity. Older
adults tend to perform poorly compared to young adults on
static emotion recognition tests, whilst outperforming them at
recognizing continuous emotions in dyadic interactions (Sze
et al., 2012). Dynamic stimuli can be used to circumvent problems
faced using static images (Biele and Grabowska, 2006; Halberstadt
et al., 2011), although both static and dynamic, visual and
prosodic affective stimuli lack contextual information (Achim
et al., 2013). Therefore, emotion recognition tasks may be most
fruitfully applied in conjunction with mental state reasoning
measures to facilitate a more comprehensive approach.
COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE
MENTALIZING
Social Vignettes
Cognitive mentalizing entails setting aside one’s own perspective
to attribute states to other agents. Both children and adults
demonstrate automatic egocentric bias in verbal and visual
perspective-taking tasks (e.g., Epley et al., 2004), however, NT
adults can partially correct for it (Wang et al., 2014). Belief-
attribution, for example, has been shown to be non-automatic in
adults (Back and Apperly, 2010). The concept that mindreading
ability is indicated by understanding not simply what someone
knows, but their mistaken beliefs (Dennett, 1978), led to the
development of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) false-belief task
(FBT), which depicts belief-states through social vignettes. In the
traditional object-transfer paradigm, participants must identify
a target agent’s mistaken belief about the location of an object,
through understanding that the agent lacks knowledge that the
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object has moved. For example, A wrongly believes that the
sweets are in the opaque jar, because they did not witness B move
them to the cupboard (first-order); B wrongly believes A will look
for the sweets in the jar, unaware that A secretly watched them
being moved (second-order).
False-belief tasks have been applied to child development
studies (for a meta-analysis, see Wellman et al., 2001), ASD
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), psychiatric disorders (Frith and
Corcoran, 1996), brain damage (Winner et al., 1998), stroke
(Happé et al., 1999), and Alzheimer’s (Le Bouc et al., 2012).
As children typically pass first- and second-order FBTs aged 4–
5 (Astington and Dack, 2008) and 6–7 (Perner and Wimmer,
1985) respectively, they tend to show ceiling effects with adults.
Adaptations for use with NT adults include a version where
participants rate the likelihood that protagonist “Sally” will look
for an object in various locations (Birch and Bloom, 2007).
Participants are privy to the object’s location in one condition,
and the task is sensitive to the interference of that knowledge
(“reality bias”; Mitchell et al., 1996).
False-belief understanding has become synonymous with
mindreading, however, the construct validity of FBTs has been
called into question (e.g., Bloom and German, 2000). For
example, the False-Belief Localizer tool for isolating the neural
basis of false-belief representation (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), is often referred to as the “ToM
Localizer,” yet the neural pattern diverges from meta-analytic
accounts of the ToM network (Spunt and Adolphs, 2014).
In developmental populations, poor FBT performance may
reflect general task demands (Siegal and Beattie, 1991; Sullivan
et al., 1994), and some individuals with ASD pass second-
order tasks whilst exhibiting real-life social cognitive difficulties
(Happé, 1994), suggesting they may recruit compensatory verbal
strategies (Happé, 1995) such as knowledge of complement
syntax (Lind and Bowler, 2009). Social animation tasks (e.g.,
Castelli et al., 2000) circumvent this issue, requiring participants
to attribute intentions to animated geometric shapes, though
they lack the range of epistemological and emotional information
present in ecological stimuli.
The computerized Yoni Test (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-
Peretz, 2007) requires integration of visual and verbal cues, and
generates both behavioral and neuroimaging data. A series of
vignettes feature a central character, “Yoni,” depicted by a simple
cartoon “smiley,” and four images of a single category (e.g., faces,
animals, and transport) alongside sentences containing blanks.
Participants indicate by mouse-clicking the appropriate image,
what Yoni is close to, thinks about, loves, does not love, or
identifies with (first-order), and whose misfortune Yoni gloats
over, whose success Yoni envies, and items Yoni thinks about,
has or loves, that another character thinks about, has or loves
(second-order). The task entails interpretation of proximity, eye-
gaze and facial expressions, and measures response time and
accuracy across cognitive, affective and physical (control) trials.
In the original study, success was higher on affective compared
to cognitive trials, a finding replicated by Kalbe et al. (2010), who
suggested that additional facial expression cues in the affective
condition facilitated decision-making (the scoring system
does not separate out the emotion recognition dimension).
Nonetheless, second-order differences between controls and
patients with ventromedial frontal lobe damage were observed
only in the affective condition, indicating that cognitive and
affective neural systems are partially dissociable (Shamay-Tsoory
and Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The Yoni Test has shown sensitivity to
variation in NT adults where FBTs have proven insufficient (e.g.,
Kidd and Castano, 2013), however, the simplistic stimuli may
enable participants to form basic object-agent associations rather
than engage in mindreading (also a criticism of FBTs; Perner
and Ruffman, 2005). The Why/How Task (Spunt and Adolphs,
2014) – an alternative approach to linking neuroscientific and
behavioral data – prevents the formation of basic associations
by asking participants how (physical) and why (mindreading)
questions about human behaviors depicted through photographs.
Designed for f MRI studies, the Why/How Task also generates
reliable behavioral (accuracy and response time) data. Whilst
simple social images do not reflect the complexity of real-world
mindreading stimuli, they present opportunities to examine the
brain basis for behavioral differences between participants.
Narrative Fiction (Prose)
Naturalistic narrative stimuli allow mindreading targets to be
contextually embedded (e.g., Frith and Corcoran, 1996; Saxe and
Wexler, 2005), which may inhibit non-mindreading strategies
(Happé, 1995). Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories Task assessed
comprehension of short, naturalistic narratives including joke,
lie, appearance/reality, and contrary emotions. The range of
narratives proved more sensitive to subtle between-group
differences than FBTs, paving the way for more complex
narrative-based approaches.
Participants in the Short Story Task (SST; Dodell-Feder et al.,
2013), read a fictional story about two characters whose romantic
relationship breaks down (Hemingway, 2003). It contains first-
and second-order mental states and requires synthesis of
contextual, verbal and physical information. Semi-structured
questions probe explicit and spontaneous mentalizing; explicit
items scored from 0 to 2, and a single spontaneous question
as a dichotomous yes/no variable. However, as the spontaneous
question prompts participants to provide “the character’s
thoughts, feelings and intentions when it applies to the question”
(Dodell-Feder et al., 2013, p. 4) the implicit/explicit distinction
is not clear cut. The coding scheme does not distinguish
cognitive and affective, or first- and second-order attributions
(indicated through low internal consistency; α = 0.54), signaling
the need for a scoring system to support a more nuanced
picture of mindreading (see Dodell-Feder et al., 2013, for some
recommendations).
The original SST demonstrated sensitivity to variation among
NT adults (scores ranged from 2 to 14 of 16 points), and
concurrent validity with the Eyes Test and Interpersonal
Reactivity Index fantasy subscale (IRI; Davis, 1983) supported
it as a measure of the mindreading construct. Notably, recent
evidence suggests that reading literary fiction can enhance
performance on mindreading measures including the Eyes
Test (Kidd and Castano, 2013), indicating that processes
associated with fiction-engagement may prime the mindreading
mechanism. In the original SST, participants completed all
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mindreading measures after reading, so future studies should
vary task order to control for potential priming effects.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL MEASURES
Narrative Fiction (Film)
Film stimuli enable researchers to present dynamic interactions
(e.g., Golan et al., 2008; Barnes et al., 2009; Bazin et al., 2009),
but can lack the range and complexity of ecological mindreading.
Using actors to simulate social scenarios offers increased control
over context and content variables. The Movie for the Assessment
of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006), features four
characters at a dinner party. A script development process (Field
et al., 2001) generated realistic characters (displaying stable
traits and transient states) and prominent themes are romance
and friendship. Participants answer direct questions about
the characters’ cognitive and affective mental states, requiring
interpretation of vocal, physical and contextual information,
alongside classic mindreading concepts such as false-beliefs,
metaphor and faux pas.
In the validation study, the MASC converged with three extant
mindreading measures: a basic emotion recognition task, the
Eyes Test and Strange Stories Task (shortened). However, MASC
scores predicted Strange Stories Task performance in participants
with Asperger Syndrome, and emotion recognition in controls,
which indicated that verbal strategies may have compensated
for facial processing difficulties. The authors recommended
future studies vary mental state complexity and part of the face
focused on (eyes/mouth). Additionally, both groups performed
at ceiling on the control questions, so future revisions should
incorporate more challenging questions to account for other
cognitive processes (Heavey et al., 2000; Dziobek et al., 2006).
Notably, the MASC was more sensitive to group differences
than the established measures, supported by a recent finding
that participants with ASD showed impaired MASC, but not
Eyes Test performance, when compared to participants with
alexithymia (a condition characterized by impaired emotion
recognition that often co-occurs with ASD; Oakley et al., 2016).
This suggested that the emotion recognition deficit deemed
characteristic of ASD may be due to alexithymia, highlighting
the MASC’s sensitivity to selective deficits and diagnostic
potential.
Versions of the MASC include the original German and
dubbed English editions [dubbing did not interfere with
participants’ task focus (Dziobek et al., 2006) and generally
does not impact information processing (Koolstra et al., 2002)].
Generalizability and longevity may be limited, however, due
to the contextually specific nature of mental state attributions
(interactions may be better understood by similar age-groups
to the characters, for example; Griffiths, 1997). This is, to some
extent, also true for fictional prose. Moreover, in light of evidence
that reading fiction can enhance mindreading, we have suggested
that narrative-engagement may prime task performance. While
task order was not reported for the MASC, similar effects have
been found for television dramas (Black and Barnes, 2015), so
future researchers should consider the potentially moderating
effects of narrative-engagement processes when employing either
fiction approach.
Participative Interaction
Individuals not only observe—they interact with—the social
world. Interactive approaches to measuring mindreading include
a participative version of the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm
(Ickes et al., 1990). Pairs of participants are covertly filmed
waiting to participate in an experiment. After debriefing, they
individually watch the footage back to identify their thoughts
and feelings, and infer the mental states of their partner. Partner
inferences are scored for accuracy. The procedure is socially valid,
but contingent on individuals accurately articulating their own
mental states (Cuff et al., 2014), and limited to the range of states
naturally occurring in the context.
The advancement of virtual environment (VE) technology
enables the construction of more complex interactive scenarios.
The Interactive Real World Task (Spiers and Maguire, 2006)
requires participants to retrospectively describe their thoughts
during a driving simulation. The original study allowed
researchers to observe patterns in f MRI data in relation
to participants’ mentalizing. The task was designed to elicit
spontaneous mindreading, however, direct questions and a
coding system containing accuracy and complexity variables
could facilitate a temporal view of explicit decoding and
reasoning processes, whilst advancing knowledge of the neural
network underlying mindreading.
Training is required prior to participation in VEs, however,
this could prove a beneficial tradeoff for studying live, interactive
mindreading whilst incorporating the range of variables available
to fiction approaches. As with fiction tasks, processes associated
with interpreting the narrative features of VEs may impact
mindreading performance; research has shown that in-game
storytelling enhances affective mindreading (e.g., Bormann and
Greitemeyer, 2015). While this necessitates additional measures
to control for individual differences in narrative-engagement,
it also signifies the potential utility of VEs in interpersonal
skills training. VE training offers greater ecological validity than
previous tools (e.g., false-belief training; Parsons and Mitchell,
2002) and preliminary data from ASD groups indicates that it
can improve both emotion recognition and mentalizing abilities
(Kandalaft et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
Extant mindreading research has primarily focused on children,
ASD, and clinical populations, and standard measures can
suffer ceiling effects with NT adults. However, several classic
tests have been adapted for research with adult cohorts. Tasks
measuring specific mindreading dimensions such as emotion
perception and cognitive mentalizing risk subtracting out key
processes, particularly as social displays can be suppressed,
and so interpreting mental states may require integration of
verbal, physical and contextual information (McDonald et al.,
2003). In contrast, complex, naturalistic approaches, including
fiction-based and interactive tasks, reflect the multiplicity of
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ecological mindreading and speak to a multi-systems cognitive
architecture (Christensen and Michael, 2016). We suggest,
however, that researchers using fictional prose, film and VEs
should consider the potentially moderating processes associated
with narrative-engagement. As VEs have proven efficacious
both in interpersonal skills development and studying the
neural basis of mindreading, this may prove a worthwhile
tradeoff. Multidimensional approaches are often resource-heavy
and necessitate complex scoring systems to avoid compensatory
strategies masking selective deficits. Therefore, we suggest the
concomitant use of established multidimensional and simpler
measures, to assess concurrent validity and probe mindreading
variation both within and between participants. In this way,
multidimensional stimuli need not problematize construct
validity, but could prove fruitful to the development of multi-
systems approaches, and studies of the neural architecture
underlying mindreading in adulthood, which in turn may expand
the wider social cognition literature.
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